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Abstract. Cloud storage has emerged as a popular paradigm to outsource data to 
third party and share it with the collaborators. While this new paradigm enables 
users to outsource their sensitive data and reduces data management costs, it 
brings forth the new challenges to the user to keep their data secure. Data storage 
security and access control in the cloud is one of the challenging ongoing 
research works to alleviate the data leakage problem from unauthorized users. 
Existing solutions that use pure cryptographic techniques suffers from heavy 
computation work with respect to key management and key distribution.  
Attribute based encryption is an alternative solution that map the user access 
structure with the data file attributes to control the data access. However any of 
the existing schemes doesn’t address the access control with assured deletion of 
the files upon revocation of user access. This article addresses this open issue 
using a trusted authority that manages the access control list and takes care of 
key management and key distribution and file deletion upon user revocation. The 
prototype of model has been presented and analyzed the security features over 
existing scheme. 
Keywords: access control; access control list; assured file deletion; cloud computing; 
cloud storage; data owner; trusted authority.  
1 Introduction 
Cloud computing brings new level of efficiency and economy to deliver an IT 
resources on demand as a service over the internet. It introduces the new 
operational and business models for the enterprise to pay for the resources as 
they use, by which it relieve the enterprise burden to invest and manage their 
own IT infrastructure. Apart from enterprises, individuals can also use cloud 
services to store their large volume of data in third-party cloud servers so as to 
relieve the users from managing their own servers for data management. Cloud 
storage (Zip cloud [1], Amazon S3 [2], MyAsiaCloud [3], Googledrive [4]) 
offers an infinite storage space for clients to store their sensitive data. However, 
it imposes the data security challenges when the users or enterprises outsource 
their sensitive data to third-party cloud servers.   
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As data owners move their data on untrusted cloud servers, it brings forth the 
high demand and concern for data confidentiality [5]. In addition to data 
confidentiality and privacy breach, the untrusted servers could use the data for 
their financial benefit and brings the huge amount of economic loss for the 
owners. In December 2010, first major data breach happened in Microsoft and it 
announced that data contained within its Business Productivity Online Suite 
(BPOS) has been downloaded by unauthorized users [6]. Another example is 
AT&T, Apple data leak protection issues in cloud breaches 100,000 of email 
addresses of iPad user’s public [7]. 
There are several research work carried out to provide secure access control 
mechanism to protect cloud outsourced data. A direct approach is to use 
cryptographic techniques onto sensitive data and disclose encryption keys only 
to authorized users. However distributing and protecting the encryption keys 
from the unauthorized users create another security issue. A number of methods 
[8]-[10] have been recently proposed to accomplish flexible and fine-grained 
access control in cloud. Unfortunately these methods do not address the file 
deletion upon data owner request to revoke file access from the cloud user.  
Cloud storage provider may not totally expunge all backup file copies from its 
storage servers and it may disclose the data to malicious users if encryption 
keys are obtained by malicious attacks. Tang, et al. [11] addresses the file 
assured deletion upon revocation of user access, which focuses only the file 
assured deletion and do not consider the fine-grained access control. 
In this paper, this open issue has been addressed for access control and file 
assured deletion and propose an ACAFD a secure, scalable access control with 
assured file deletion for cloud computing. ACAFD uses the trusted authority to 
decouple the access control maintenance, key management and key distribution 
activity from the cloud service provider. Data owner submit the access control 
details for the file it upload in the cloud and obtain the RSA public keys from 
the trusted authority. Further the data owner encrypts the file with a symmetric 
key and encrypts the symmetric key with session key and stores it in the Cloud 
Service Provider (CSP). Disclosing access details to CSP may create possibility 
to change the access rights when the CSP collude with any malicious users. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 related research 
work has been reviewed.  Section 3 presents system models and assumptions. 
Section 4 represents algorithms of proposed scheme. In Section 5, ACAFD has 
been analyzed with existing scheme. Finally Section 7 concludes the paper and 
presents the future research direction. 
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2 Related Work 
There are several research work carried out to address the access control issues 
in cloud computing. Yu, et al. [8] proposed a scheme to achieve secure, scalable 
and fine grained access control in cloud computing. They combined the 
techniques of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), Proxy re-encryption [12] and 
lazy re-encryption [13] to achieve the data access control on untrusted cloud-
servers. Each data file can be related with attribute set. A user access structure is 
defined using a unique logical expression over these attributes, which indicate 
the user access level to access that file. Unique public keys are defined for each 
attributes. Data files are encrypted using the public keys associated with that 
attributes. Users are able to decrypt the file with secret key defined for their 
access structure, by which it allow the file decryption if and only if data file 
attribute match with the user access structure. However deriving a unique 
logical expression using attribute set for each data file will create heavy 
computation overhead for data owner. Besides, re-encryption of data file upon 
revocation of user access requires updating the secret keys of all user except the 
revoked one, becomes an issue if the number of users are large. 
Wan, et al. [9] proposed a scheme that supports the hierarchical user structure to 
achieve scalable and fine-grained access control. They extend the ciphertext – 
policy attribute based encryption with the hierarchical user structure. Data 
owners who encrypt the file specify an access structure for the ciphertext. The 
users can decrypt the ciphertext with the decryption keys, only if the attributes 
specified in the key structure satisfy the access structure given by the data 
owner. Computation complexity varies depending upon the depth of key 
structure and access tree structure. Hence, the decryption is performed at the 
data consumer, it impact the scalability of the overall system. 
Hota, et al. [10] proposed a capability-based access control to guarantee 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication in cloud outsourced data. Data 
owner create the capability list and update in cloud service provider. The 
encrypted data files and capability list are stored in cloud service provider. 
Based on the user request for file access, the CSP will verify the capability list 
and send the encrypted data file to the user. Hence the symmetric keys are 
known only between the data owner and data user, the CSP will not know 
anything about the data file. However, it may create the possibility for the CSP 
to change the access control information incase if it colludes with the malicious 
users.  
Yun, et al. [14] proposed a cryptographic file system to provide integrity and 
confidentiality guarantee for outsourced data. It performs the encryption based 
on universal-hash based MAC tree scheme. Goh, et al. [15] proposed a secure 
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file system for remote untrusted storage called SiRiUS. It divides the file into 
two parts, file data and meta data file. The file data contains the encrypted and 
signed contents while meta data file includes the access control details. The file 
data encrypted using the file encryption key and signed using file signature key. 
The meta data file contains several encrypted key blocks that represent number 
of users access to that file. Each key block is encrypted with respective user 
master encryption key (MEK) that includes file encryption key (FEK) for read 
users and both file encryption key (FEK) and file signature key (FSK) for read 
and write privilege users. In addition, the first key block in meta data file 
encrypted using owner’s master encryption key (MEK) and  entire meta data 
file signed using owner’s master signature key (MSK). In order to ensure 
freshness guarantees the timestamp is included in meta data file. However, there 
is no provision to ensure freshness guarantees for data file in SiRiUS that make 
data file are prone to replay attacks.  
Tang, et al. [11] proposed a scheme that enables file assured deletion once the 
user access is revoked. The data file that is uploaded to the cloud is associated 
with the access policy.  
The control keys are created and maintained by the key manager and it is 
associated to each policy. The data file will be encrypted with a data key and 
data key further encrypted using a control key corresponding to that file access 
policy. Once the access policy revoked, the corresponding control keys are 
deleted from the key manager.  Hence, the main design objective of this scheme 
is to ensure file assured deletion, there is no strategy used for fine-grained 
access control. So our main objective in this paper is to provide the framework 
that incorporates both secure and scalable access control with assured file 
deletion. 
3 System Model and Assumptions 
3.1 System Model 
As shown in Figure 1, the cloud computing system in our model consists of the 
following entities: Data owner (DO), Data Consumer (DC), Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP), Trusted authority (TA), Group Manager (GM), Group Member 
(GMem).  
The DO creates the Access Control List (ACL) for the data file to be uploaded 
into the CSP and submit it to the TA in secure manner. In case of group access 
for the file, the DO submit the single ACL entry in TA to support scalability. 
The GM is the top-level entity that authorizes the DC who belongs to the 
groups. The TA is the trusted node that manages the ACL list and provides the 
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RSA public key based on the DO request.  The DO encrypt the data file with the 
symmetric key and upload it in the CSP. The DC should get the certificate from 
the TA to access the data file resides in the CSP. Similar to [10] the DO and DC 
comes online only if it needs to upload and download the file in CSP. The TA, 
CSP and GM are always online. The DO can be a project manager in an 
organization who upload the project related document in a CSP or can be 
university teachers who upload the course material into the CSP. DC can be 
employees in an organization or the students who access the course materials in 
a university. The DO can upload the files that can be read by individual 
employee in an organization or it can be related to the group of employees. 
  
 
Figure 1 System Model. 
3.2 Security Model 
In this model, the CSP is assumed as untrusted entity that may collude with the 
malicious users to change the access control information, even to harm the file 
contents stored in the cloud. The TA is the trusted entity that resides within the 
DO domain to be responsible for key and access control management. TA 
ensures that the master key which is used to encrypt the file key will be 
removed in case of user revocation of file access. Also this scheme assumes that 
each party is already preloaded with other parties public key using an existing 
PKI infrastructure. 
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4 Algorithms of Proposed Scheme 
In this section, the data structures and algorithm of ACAFD scheme has been 
described. Table 1 show the acronym used in our algorithm along with its 
definition. 
Table 1 Glossary. 
Acronym Definition 
Kpriv_owner   private key of owner 
Kpub_owner    public key of owner 
Kpriv_Gmem    private key of group member 
Kpub_Gmem    public key of group member 
Kpriv_CSP        private key of service provider 
Kpub_CSP      public key of service provider 
fi          ith File 
HMAC Hash algorithm 
FID   File ID 
OwnerID   Owner identifier 
AR     Access Rights 
ei, ni              RSA public key of ith user 
SK    Symmetric Key for file encryption 
Si secret key 
Ri    Random number 
 
4.1 File Upload 
The DO creates the access control lists that consist of File Identifier, User 
Identifier, and Access Rights and File creation time and expiration time. In case 
of group access instead of user identifier the owner create the Access control list 
with the group identifier. The ACL lists are encrypted using the owner’s private 
key first and then encrypted using TA public key and transferred to the TA. The 
over encryption [16] ensures the authentication and confidentiality between the 
DO and TA.  TA decrypts the ACL List using the public key of data owner and 
its own private key and stores it in its database.  TA generates the RSA public 
key e, n for the specified file id and sends it to the DO with the X.509 
certificate. DO generate the random symmetric key SK for encrypting the file 
using the AES encryption algorithm.  DO compute the hash value HMAC for 
the file to be uploaded and encrypt the file and HMAC using symmetric key. 
Along with the encrypted file, DO send the FID, OwnerID, siei(modni) to the CSP. 
The creation time and expiration time in the ACL ensures the freshness of the 
ACL list and automatic user revocation of file access. The Figure 2 shows the 
file upload procedures. 
24 Sudha  Senthilkumar & Madhu Viswanatham 
 
Figure 2 File uploads procedure. 
Algorithm for file uploads: 
Step 1: Preparing a ACL List in DO and send it to TA 
                    DO -> TA 
1.1 For each file fi create ACL 
                    ACL  <-  Epub_TA(EKpriv_owner(FID,UID,AR,Creation_Time, Exp_ time)) 
Step 2: Obtain RSA public key from TA 
                            TA - > DO 
  Receive certificate (ei, ni) 
Step 3: upload File to CSP 
               DO -> CSP 
 3.1 generate random symmetric key SK 
 3.2 encrypt the file and HMAC using SK  
  Esk(F,HMAC) 
 3.2 Encrypt SK using si   
                            Esi (SK) 
 3.3 Send the encrypted file along with FID,ownerID and key details to CSP 
                           CSP  < - EKpriv_owner(Epub_CSP( (FID,ownerID), si eimodni , Esi 
(SK),Esk(F,HMAC))) 
      3.4 CSP decrypts the file upload message and stores the files along with the file 
details in its database. 
                      CSP <- DKpub_owner(Dpriv_CSP( (FID,ownerID), si eimodni , Esi 
(SK),Esk(F,HMAC))) 
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4.2 File Download 
The DC send the request for file access to TA with the unique file id, user id 
and access right request along with the timestamp of request and nonce. The file 
access request will be encrypted using the consumer private key and TA public 
key for the purpose of authentication and confidentiality. The TA decrypts the 
request using its own private key and then with consumer public key. If DC 
belongs to the group, he should be authorized from GM before it can request for 
file access. The file access request for the group member will be encrypted 
using the group member private key along with (GID, AR) that is encrypted 
with group manager private key. The entire file request is over encrypted using 
TA public key for authentication and confidentiality purpose. Timestamp and 
Nonce in the file access request are used to eliminate the replay attacks that may 
occur between the communicating parties [17]. 
      
 
Figure 3 File Download. 
Based on the file access request, TA checks ACL list to verify the authenticity 
of DC. In case of valid user the TA provide file access certificate to DC that are 
encrypted with CSP public key. The DC forwards the certificate to the CSP in 
order to download the file from CSP. The CSP decrypts the certificate with its 
private key and then fetch the file based on the certificate and send encrypted 
file and key details to the DC. Based on the blinded RSA [4] DC generates the 
random parameter R, compute R eimodni   and include with Si eimodni.  Now DC 
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passes the Si eimodni R eimodni to the TA to obtain the secret key in secure manner. 
The TA then computes (Si eimodni Ri eimodni)dimodni which is equal to ((SiRi) eimodni) 
dimodni.  
 DC will obtain the ((SiRi) eimodni) dimodni from TA which is equal to SiRi. 
Now DC can remove Ri from SiRi and obtain Si, and decrypt Si(SK) to obtain 
symmetric key SK. Further DC can decrypt the file fi, HMAC using symmetric 
key SK [9]. The Figure 3 describes the file download procedures. 
Algorithm for file downloads: 
Step 1: DC or GMem send the request for file access to TA 
 TA <-  (Epub_TA(EKpriv_DC(FID,UID,AR,Timestamp, Nonce)))  or 
             TA <- (Epub_TA(EKpriv_GMem(FID,UID,AR,Timestamp, Nonce), 
EKpriv_GM(GID,AR) )) 
Step 2: TA provide the certificate for file access to DC 
 DC <- (Epub_CSP(FID, AR,Timestamp, Nonce)) 
Step 3: DC will forward the certificate to CSP 
 CSP <- (Epub_CSP(FID, AR,Timestamp, Nonce)) 
Step 4: CSP fetch the files based on the File ID and send to DC 
 DC <- EKpub_DC(Epriv_CSP (FID, ownerID), Si eimodni  , ESi (SK),Esk(F,HMAC))) 
Step 5: DC  decrypt the message and apply blind component R to secret key Si eimodni Ri 
eimodni
 and send to TA to request secret key 
     5.1 DC <- DKpriv_DC(Dpub_CSP (FID, ownerID), Si eimodni  , ESi (SK),Esk(F,HMAC))) 
     5.2  TA<- (Si eimodni Ri eimodni) 
Step 6: TA compute ((SiRi) eimodni) dimodni and pass it to DC DC <- (((SiRi) eimodni) 
dimodni) => SiRi  
Step 7:  DC remove Ri from SiRi and obtain Si, decrypt symmetric key SK with Si, using 
SK it will decrypt the file and obtain HMAC and verify the integrity with newly 
computed HMAC. 
 
 DSi(SK), Dsk(F,HMAC)  
 
File Deletion:  When a user leave the organization, the DO should ensure their 
access control is revoked from the TA. The TA delete RSA private key of 
corresponding file once the access control is removed from its database. 
Without the RSA private key di, it is impossible to obtain Si and without Si it is 
not possible to know the SK to decrypt the file fi. This meets our main design 
objective of assured file deletion once the user file access is revoked from CSP. 
In case of group user revocation, the TA keeps the RSA private key di until the 
entire users in the groups are revoked. However the user ID in the group is 
removed by the group manager. 
5 Security Analysis 
In this section, the security properties of ACAFD scheme have been analyzed 
and then discussed the performance analysis of ACAFD scheme in each 
operation.  
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Confidentiality and Integrity: The proposed ACAFD scheme discloses only 
the encrypted file details into the CSP, other details like access control 
information and key management are maintained by the trusted entity TA. This 
ensures that our scheme prevent the CSP to collude with malicious user’s to 
change the access rights. Also the message exchange between all the 
communicating parties uses over encryption, which ensures the authentication 
and confidentiality of this scheme. Increasing key length using over encryption 
makes brute-force attack is very difficult. The key exchange between DO and 
DC are securely performed using blinded RSA method [11]. 
To ensure the integrity of the file, the DO compute the HMAC for the outsource 
file and then the file, HMAC is uploaded into CSP. After fetching a file, the DC 
computes the HMAC from the decrypted file and compares it with HMAC that 
is provided with the DO. If both match, the DC can assure the integrity of the 
file. 
Freshness Guarantees:  In order to ensure the freshness of access control 
information, the DO include the creation_time and expiration time Exp_time 
with the ACL list. In case of ACL list update for the specific file, the DO can 
update the creation_time and as well as expiration time.  This will allow TA to 
perform timely revocation of user access [18] and help TA to prevent the access 
control rollback attacks. 
Key Management: The key distributions and key maintenance are the 
responsibility of trusted entity TA which reduces the burden for DO to 
distribute the keys to authorized users. Also the TA removes the RSA private 
key of the files based upon the user revocation for specific file access. As per 
our design it is not possible to obtain the symmetric key without the RSA 
private key of that file. Hence the file cannot be recovered by anyone else. This 
implies the assured file deletion once the user access for the file is revoked. 
Access Control Management: The DO is disclosing the access control details 
to the TA in a secured manner.  It also makes a single entry for the group 
members to access the same file that is authorized by the GM. This supports the 
scalability to avoid the multiple entries for same file access. Also to make the 
TA more reliable, we can expand the TA with quorum of TA as mentioned in 
[14],[19]. As per this scheme, only files and key details have been disclosed in 
encrypted form which needs to be uploaded into CSP. Other than that the CSP 
will not know any information related to access details of the files. This 
prevents the CSP to collude with malicious users to change the access control 
information [8]. 
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6 Performance Analysis 
New File Creation:  To create a new file, the DO needs to update the ACL 
entry in TA, and should obtain RSA public key information from the TA. After 
this DO can generate the random symmetric key by which they can encrypt the 
data file. Further, symmetric key are encrypted using a secret key and secret key 
are raised to the power eimodni to transmit key securely. Here the complexity of 
file creation involves size of data file, the type of symmetric key algorithm 
used, algorithm used for encrypting a symmetric key and secret key raised to the 
power of eimodni. Assume T1 is a total time required to encrypt a file fi, encrypt 
symmetric key SK using Si and raise a secret key to the power eimodni . T2 is 
the transmission time to upload the file in CSP and T3 is the decryption time at 
CSP then time complexity for new file creation is O(N) where N = T1+T2+T3. 
Efficient File Access: DC can request for file access to the TA.  TA verifies the 
authority of the DC and if DC is valid user, it prepares the certificate and sends 
it to DC.  DC forwards the certificate to CSP to obtain the file information. 
According to the TA certificate, CSP obtain the file details from its database 
and transmit to DC. Further DC request TA to obtain secret key using blinded 
RSA and then decrypt the files. Assume if T1 is the total time required to 
prepare file access request and transmit, time required to receive the certificate 
and time required to forward the certificate. T2 is the file transmission time 
from CSP to TA and T3 is the request for secret key and reply and T4 is the 
decryption time at DC then time complexity is O(N) where N = T1+T2+T3+T4. 
Efficient User Revocation:  To deal with efficient user revocation, we have 
included the expiration time in each ACL entry by which the TA can perform 
automatic user revocation. Once the DO request the removal of use access 
rights, the TA remove the specific ACL entry from its database. So the time 
complexity to revoke the use access is O(1). 
File Deletion: After deletion of ACL entry, the TA deletes the RSA private key 
of that user associated with that file. Without the RSA private key, the data file 
in CSP is no more accessible by any users. This fulfills the file assured deletion 
of our ACAFD scheme. The time complexity for file deletion is O(1). 
7 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper ACAFD prototype has been presented, which provides the secure 
access control with assured file deletion. This scheme seamlessly integrates set 
of cryptographic file operations to secure the files outsourced to cloud. Further 
this scheme empowers the DO to upload the file into CSP without disclosing the 
access control information in CSP. This scheme not only provides the efficient 
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access to the file, but also achieves the efficient user revocation, file deletion 
and freshness guarantees in access control. The theoretical security and 
performance analyzes have been discussed which provides the insight into 
security–performance trade-off of this scheme when it is deployed into cloud. 
In future extension, this ACAFD scheme will be implemented into real public 
cloud like Amazon S3 or Microsoft Azure to prove the security of this scheme. 
Further the quorum scheme into the TA will be implemented to enhance the 
reliability of the TA in case of access control and key management.  
Enhancement into this current design involves including the trusted third party 
auditor service to assess the cloud service risks. 
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